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ARTICLES
ARBITRATION: GOVERNANCE BENEFITS AND
ENFORCEMENT COSTS
Keith N. Hylton*
INTRODUcTION
It is difficult to talk about arbitration from a theoretical perspec-
tive without saying things that are equally applicable to law in general.
Much of what I will say in these remarks sketch out a theory of law and
law enforcement, or norms and norm enforcement. Arbitration can
be viewed as just one special and important application.
We can think of law as creating a web of rules within which social
intercourse is supposed to take place. Alternatively, you can think of
law as providing a frame, like the frame of a building. Either way, it is
a structure, a spine, a basic set of parameters within which people are
free to arrange their affairs.
Now, once you have spun this web of rules, how do you get peo-
ple to stay inside it? There will be individuals who will want to stick
their fingers outside of the web, and may want to do so on a regular
basis, perhaps because they get some private gain by refusing to stay
within the structure that everyone else is abiding by. The usual way of
getting people to stay within the web of rules is through enforcement.
That typically involves setting a penalty that falls on the person who
violates a norm or legal rule. We can think of this as a hammer that
someone holds as he stands on the other side of the web of rules.
When he sees a finger poke through the web, he hits it hard with his
hammer, creating sufficient pain to deter the offender and like-
minded others from poking their fingers through the web.
* Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University,
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Enforcement is not the only way to guarantee norm or law com-
pliance. We can also rely on repeat dealing, reputation, and reciproc-
ity. Someone who breaches contracts regularly will find that there are
few others willing to trade with him. If his potential associates are
rational, they will take even the slightest hint that he is unreliable as a
strong signal to keep their distance. In the repeat-contracting setting,
the norm-violator's conduct will bring its own punishment. However,
outside of the contract setting, we find other settings in which repeat
dealing may not be observed. A thief who burgles houses in the mid-
dle of the night does not have to worry about repeat dealing because
success in his conduct depends on avoiding detection by others.
The law itself plays a role in controlling conduct, separate and
apart from the force or penalty applied by any enforcement authority.
While introducing the web metaphor, I described enforcement as if it
were carried out by someone standing outside of the web wielding a
hammer. The law itself sets the rules, or the boundaries of the web.
Society might choose to change the boundaries to make it more or
less difficult to avoid being found in violation of the law in some cases.
For example, if we know that the hammer-wielder will catch only fifty
percent of the norm-violators, we may want to change the norm (or
law) so that it is difficult for a violator to avoid being found in viola-
tion. We might reduce the number of defenses, or the amount of
evidence necessary to prove a violation of the law. For example, if we
think law enforcement authorities are unlikely to catch most people
engaged in price-fixing, we might structure the law so that there are
few defenses available to anyone charged with price-fixing. This is, in
fact, what we see.
It should be clear from this description how arbitration should be
described. The courts, and the common law, provide the normal, or
default, set of rules and enforcement conditions. Arbitration provides
an alternative set of rules and enforcement procedures. For parties
who can choose to submit their disputes to arbitration, they have a
choice between two legal regimes: the court regime and the arbitra-
tion regime. Arbitration, in effect, provides the parties with the op-
portunity to set up a different set of rules-that is, to structure a web
that is shaped differently from that spun by the courts. Also, arbitra-
tion provides them the opportunity to appoint a different hammer-
wielder, one who hits harder or perhaps more softly, or more or less
frequently, than we see under the court regime.
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In the remainder of these remarks, I will sketch a framework for
choosing between alternative legal regimes.' I will start by sketching
the basic theory and then move on to see whether the theory is consis-
tent with empirical evidence. The theory emphasizes two key aspects
to the choice between legal regimes: governance benefits and enforce-
ment costs.
I. GOVERNANCE BENEFITS AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS
Any set of rules governing interaction among private parties is
likely to provide a benefit for which the parties are willing to pay. For
example, the simplest type of benefit may be coordinating their con-
duct, like the rules of order (i.e., who moves when) in a game. More
complicated and controversial rules will govern the amount of risk
that one can impose on others. The parties will be willing to pay an
amount that reflects the costs saved by having rules. A rule against
breaching contracts, if complied with perfectly, provides an ex ante
benefit equal to the expected net cost (i.e., loss to victim less gain to
breaching party) of a breached contract. 2 I will refer to the ex ante
benefits provided by rules as governance benefits.
In order to secure these benefits, the parties will have to bear
some costs. One cost is the cost of writing rules. When parties rely on
the common law as the source of rules, the cost of writing rules is
bundled into the fixed costs of having courts. Those costs are not
borne entirely by the parties to a particular dispute because they are
part of the general government budget, and shared by all individuals,
whether litigants or not. In addition to the cost of writing rules, the
most significant cost borne by potential litigants is the enforcement cost.
Since we are talking about private litigation, enforcement costs are
usually the costs of litigating to enforce the rules governing private
interaction.
It follows that any set of rules governing private conduct can be
described as having governance benefits and enforcement costs. The
courts generate rules that have clear governance benefits, to the ex-
tent they describe and proscribe socially undesirable conduct, and en-
forcement costs, since the rules must be enforced by the very
individuals who benefit from them.
In settings where parties are repeat dealers, or involved in long-
term contracts, they are in a position to compare the governance ben-
1 The argument is based largely on Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to
Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 209 (2000).
2 For a richer analysis of governance benefits in the contractual context, see OLI
VER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 68-84 (1985).
2005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
efits and enforcement costs of the rules governing their conduct.
They can decide whether a certain rule is too expensive, because the
governance benefit associated with that rule is less than its enforce-
ment cost. If they decide that a particular rule is too expensive, they
may agree among themselves to waive the rule. If parties are rational
and well-informed, they will waive a legal rule whenever the govern-
ance benefit from the rule is less than the enforcement cost.
"Now wait a minute," you might say, "why would someone who is
protected by a legal rule waive it, merely because the expected total
cost of enforcement is greater than the total governance benefit?"
Even if the total governance benefit is less than the total enforcement
cost, it may still be the case that for that individual who is protected by
the rule, the governance benefit he enjoys is greater than the enforce-
ment cost he would bear. Assuming a setting of repeat dealers, there
will be an opportunity, if transaction costs are low, for that individual
to be compensated ex ante for waiving the rule.3 Since total welfare
would be enhanced by waiving enforcement of the rule, there is a set
of transactions that would leave all parties better off under an agree-
ment that waives the rule. This is just an application of the Coase
theorem. 4
Why might the governance benefits of a legal rule fall short of its
enforcement costs? In some cases, the harm that results from a viola-
tion is too small to justify the expense of going to court. The claims
could be aggregated and brought on a class-wide basis. Alternatively,
these matters could be treated as issues that will be dealt with through
repeat dealing, reputation, or reciprocal conduct (tit-for-tat). In
other cases, the likelihood of a real violation of the norm may be so
small that the expected governance benefits of the rule are clearly less
than the expected enforcement costs generated by frivolous claims.
Even if the governance benefit of a legal rule is greater than its
enforcement cost, there may still be an incentive to waive it if the dif-
ferential between governance benefits and enforcement costs is not
3 Compensation could take the form of an implicit understanding that if you
ignore the slight harms I inflict on you, I will ignore the slight harms you inflict on
me. Alternatively, one of the parties might agree to some concession to the other
party, with an implicit understanding that the other party will not litigate over some
issue in the future. On the adoption of norms (sometimes involving the waiver of
strict rights) that deviate from the explicit law, see generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, OR-
DER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 123-30 (1991).
4 A rough statement of the Coase theorem is as follows: if transaction costs are
low, parties will find side payments that will lead them to adopt the most efficient
allocation of resources. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
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sufficiently large. Again, suppose that parties are involved in repeat
dealings. Any party that breaches the rule would be punished by a
refusal by the other party to deal with him. Since punishment by tit-
for-tat refusals to deal or through group ostracism may be an effective
means of enforcing group norms, the parties may decide to waive the
legal rule.5 The legal rule, in this scenario, provides insubstantial in-
cremental governance benefits, while at the same time introducing a
substantial enforcement cost.
The same considerations that go into the decision to waive a legal
right go into the decision to arbitrate. Arbitration provides an alter-
native forum in which parties can structure rules and enforcement
methods so that the difference between governance benefits and en-
forcement costs is larger than in the default regime represented by
ordinary courts. Why might the difference between governance bene-
fits and enforcement costs be larger under arbitration than in the
court system? There are several possible reasons.
First, one might find that the governance benefits associated with
a given rule can be enhanced by moving into the arbitration regime.
Suppose, for example, that a court is likely to make mistakes when
deciding whether a group norm was violated. If the court is likely to
make mistakes, the governance benefits associated with that particular
rule could be enhanced by having it enforced in a regime in which
adjudication is more accurate. 6 Under a more accurate regime, peo-
ple who were innocent of violating the norm would have less reason to
fear that they would be punished by mistake, and people who had
violated the norm would have less reason to expect that they would
escape punishment. To return to the web analogy that I began with,
the arbitration regime may be one in which the norm-enforcer swings
his hammer more accurately than under the court regime.
Second, even if the governance benefits from a particular rule are
the same within the court regime and within arbitration, a group
might find that the enforcement cost is much lower within arbitration.
For example, with a more accurate set of decisionmakers, the parties
might find that the evidentiary burdens of proving their arguments in
court are lower under the arbitration regime. Thus, even if there are
no governance benefits associated with enhanced accuracy, there may
5 For such a waiver to occur, it is not necessary for the parties to get together and
sign a formal waiver contract. They may decide to conduct their affairs, as Ellickson
found in Shasta County, California, without resort to lawsuits. See EHICKSON, supra
note 3, at 130.
6 Hylton, supra note 1, at 223-26; see Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
An Economic Analysis, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 6 (1995) (using an economic analysis to deter-
mine benefits and choices of parties regarding dispute resolution options).
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be substantial enforcement cost savings. In addition, the arbitration
regime may be able to develop a special efficiency or productivity in
considering disputes of a given nature. This will reduce the cost of
enforcement for claims falling within its ambit.
Third, one should note there is a close connection between en-
forcement costs and governance benefits. An increase in enforce-
ment costs can reduce governance benefits. If the cost of enforcing is
too high relative to the private benefit a litigant gets from bringing
suit, he will drop his claim. But that means rule violators whose vic-
tims fall within this group are effectively shielded from the law. They
will continue to act in a socially undesirable manner. It follows that
an arbitration regime may enhance governance benefits simply by in-
troducing a cheaper method of claim enforcement.
Congestion provides an important reason why arbitration agree-
ments may involve cheaper enforcement costs than the court regime.
Congestion in ordinary courts makes it less likely that any court will
have the time or resources to match the level of accuracy in adjudica-
tion that repeat dealers are likely to desire. Congestion also in-
troduces delay, which increases the cost of enforcement. Given these
costs, it is quite plausible that sophisticated parties who are repeat
dealers will prefer to set up their own arbitration regime rather than
submit all of their disputes to the courts. Of course, this preference
may not be put into effect because it is costly to set up an arbitration
regime. And to do so involves foregoing some of the governance ben-
efits already provided by courts.
One well-known argument against the contractualist approach
taken here points to the importance of external effects. According to
the argument, arbitration may be socially undesirable because it
reduces the stock of publicly accessible legal rules and stunts the de-
velopment of law. 7 It follows from this argument that individuals, or
groups, may be too quick from a social standpoint to commit their
disputes to arbitration. The reason is that they fail to take into ac-
count the benefits externalized to others when they litigate in the
courts.
The externality critique of arbitration raises potentially important
issues, but there are reasons to doubt the importance of the issues too.
If the argument is understood as opposing any agreements that divert
7 For the most general source for such arguments, see Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). For the argument applied to arbitration, see Ed-
ward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability
Question, 60 S. CAL. L. Rrv. 1059, 1081-82 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985),
has permitted party autonomy to govern state-imposed objectives).
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disputes away from a final judgment in court, including settlement
agreements, then it must be regarded as an untenable position. Set-
tlements tend to occur when the law is relatively clear and neither
party has a desire to seek to change it. Banning settlements will there-
fore do little to enhance the stock of publicly accessible legal rules.8 If
the argument is understood as opposing only arbitration agreements,
then its concerns could be met by requiring that the law developed
within arbitration be made publicly accessible, rather than banning
arbitration altogether. In addition, parties opt for arbitration in some
cases to secure enhanced governance benefits. In such cases, the
gains to the parties will be substantial while the external costs imposed
on others are likely to be trivial and remote.9
Much of the foregoing argument depends on the ability of parties
to make intelligent choices. The most obvious case in which this does
not hold is that of mandatory arbitration. I am not using the term
"mandatory arbitration" to refer to arbitration contracts in the em-
ployment setting, as many writers do. I refer to state-mandated re-
gimes that require litigating parties to go into arbitration before
entering the courts. 10 There is no guarantee in the case of state-man-
dated arbitration that arbitration will go into effect when and only
when the difference between governance benefits and enforcement
costs is greater within arbitration than in the courts. Indeed,
mandatory arbitration may have the perverse effect of driving up the
overall cost of litigation,1" as litigants realize that in order to pursue
their claims, they may have to go through arbitration and then into
8 Hylton, supra note 1, at 244.
9 Id. at 245-47. Of course, in the final analysis, the externality critique of arbi-
tration raises issues that should be resolved by examining empirical evidence. The
arguments in the text merely show that the externality critique is not persuasive on
theoretical grounds. What if the externality critique cannot be evaluated empirically?
Then the critique should be viewed as a purely speculative argument that awaits some
empirical verification.
10 Many states have enacted statutes requiring arbitration for certain types of civil
disputes before a trial. States requiring arbitration in at least some circumstances
include Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, and Washington. See Lucy Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two-Sides of the Coin?, 1993J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 8
n.37. For an empirical analysis of one type of state-mandated arbitration, see Donald
Wittman, Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis, 5 Am.
L. & ECON. REV. 61 (2003).
11 See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court Connected ADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169, 2211-12 (1993)
(analyzing the impact of mandatory arbitration).
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the courts. This realization may lead potential claimants to drop their
claims, which in effect provides an immunity shield to rule violators.
The other case in which real choice might not be observed is that
of the so-called adhesion contract. I refer to contracts in which one of
the parties is offered a take-it-or-leave-it standard form and may be
effectively uninformed about the terms of the deal. He signs the form
because he feels in some sense coerced to sign. If one of the parties
signs an agreement to arbitrate without being aware of the terms of
the deal, he may find that he has entered a regime in which the gov-
ernance benefits, for him, disappear entirely.
However, the adhesion contract theory must be viewed as a the-
ory or hypothesis and not much more. People sign take-it-or-leave-it
contracts all the time without being fully aware of all of the terms of
the deal. We often rely on what we see of the experiences of others.
We see that a neighbor bought a high-tech refrigerator and it works
quite well. We decide on the basis of that neighbor's experience to
buy one ourselves. Or we rely on the reports provided by consumers
to a neutral source. The mere fact that someone signs a contract with-
out being aware of all of its terms does not tell us whether the provi-
sions of the contract were, or whether any particular provision of the
contract was, a bad or good deal.
The mere fact that an arbitration agreement appears as a take-it-
or-leave-it provision of a contract does not tell whether or not the of-
feree signed the contract based on a reasonably informed choice over
his alternatives. Nor does it tell us whether or not the offeree gained
an ex ante benefit from signing the contract. If he gained a benefit
from signing the contract, and had reason to expect that he would, he
should be held to his agreement in most cases.
Whether arbitration agreements specified in adhesion contracts
are socially undesirable is an empirical question. 12 Given this, the ar-
gument against arbitration contracts framed in adhesion contracts
should be taken as a hypothesis to be tested. The question to test is as
follows: if we confine ourselves to contracts of adhesion, is the differ-
ence between governance benefits and enforcement costs lower for
arbitration than for the courts? Until someone answers this question,
the argument for banning arbitration agreements set out in take-it-or-
leave-it contracts is based on speculation.
12 For a detailed examination of the issues, see Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of
Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 89.
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II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Now let's consider the empirical evidence. As far as I am aware,
few studies have attempted to find evidence of governance benefits
from arbitration. Most empirical studies in this area examine the re-
sults of arbitration-e.g., damage awards and plaintiff win rates.
13
Perhaps the most careful of the recent studies is one by Theodore
Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill. 14
Eisenberg and Hill present empirical evidence on the results of
non-civil rights employment disputes heard by courts and by arbitra-
tors. They find that for high-pay employees (more than $65,000 per
year) the outcomes from arbitration and litigation are the same. 15
The win rates and mean damage awards are roughly equal in their
samples of arbitrated and litigated cases.' 6 However, they also find a
substantial plaintiff win rate (forty percent) for claims brought by low-
pay employees in arbitration.17 In addition, in the sample used by
Eisenberg and Hill, the total number of claims taken into arbitration
by low-pay employees (eighty-eight) exceeds the total number of
claims taken into arbitration by high-pay employees (seventy-seven). 18
In interpreting Eisenberg and Hill's results, one should keep in
mind that very few low-pay employees bring employment disputes into
court. As they note in their paper, most attorneys say that the damage
award must be at least $60,000 in order to cover the costs of litiga-
tion.' 9 Most low-pay employees are unable to find an attorney willing
to prosecute their claims.
Keeping this fact in mind, the Eisenberg and Hill results suggest
that arbitration may provide substantial governance benefits in the
workplace. If high-pay employees are receiving roughly the same
treatment in arbitration as they get in court, and low-pay employees
are able to pursue claims that would otherwise never gain the atten-
13 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EM-
PLOYEE RTS. & POL'YJ. 189, 205-17 (1997) (analyzing how knowledge of multiple
arbitration affects employees); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment
Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, Disp. RESOL. J.,
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 44.
14 Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth T. Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litiga-
tion: An Empirical Comparison (Mar. 5, 2003) (unpublished draft), available at http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=389780. For a closely related paper, see Elizabeth Hill, Due Pro-
cess at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the
American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 777 (2003).
15 Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 14, at 14-19.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 14.
19 Id. at 10.
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tion of a competent lawyer, then the total number of claims against
employers must be larger under arbitration. This suggests that the
governance benefits are larger under arbitration, at least in the area
of non-civil rights employment claims. Moreover, the issues that are
of special concern to low-pay employees are more likely to be ad-
dressed in arbitration.
The only paper to look directly for evidence of substantial gov-
ernance benefits in connection to arbitration is one that I coauthored
with Chris Drahozal.20 Our study examines franchise contracts, many
of which include arbitration provisions. We examined the factors that
determine the presence of arbitration provisions in a franchise con-
tract. Our results show that the traditional factors cited in the
franchise literature as important aspects of governance have a substan-
tial effect on the likelihood of an arbitration provision being present
in the franchise contract.
To understand the results of my study with Chris Drahozal, it is
helpful first to consider one of the fundamental results of the litera-
ture on the economics of franchise contracts. 21 One key result is that
the franchisee has an incentive under certain circumstances to "free
ride" on the brand capital of the franchisor. For example, consider
McDonald's. If an individual McDonald's franchisor cuts its costs and
at the same time lowers the quality of its product, the franchisor will
enjoy the full benefit of the cost reduction while externalizing the
reputational harm to other business units in the chain. 22 That is be-
cause many of the customers view each McDonald's outlet as inter-
changeable and associate any negative experience in quality with the
whole enterprise. Given this, one of the major governance problems
present in any franchise contract is discouraging franchisees from free
riding on the franchisor's brand.
One empirical measure of the incentive to free ride is the per-
centage of business units owned by the franchisor. As that percentage
increases, the incentive to free ride falls. That is because as more busi-
ness units are owned by the franchisor itself, the less likely it is that
20 Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbi-
tration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J! LEGAL STUD. 549 (2003).
21 See Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract,
21 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1978).
22 For example, McDonald's has a rule governing the number of minutes that a
cooked hamburger can sit waiting for a customer to purchase it before it must be
thrown out. An individual franchisor could cut its costs by violating the rule. How-
ever, many customers, who are often travelers, will attribute the bad experience to the
whole franchise.
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any individual business unit will think that it can externalize any re-
duction in quality to other units in the chain.
Chris Drahozal and I found that the percentage of company-
owned units in a franchise is negatively associated with the probability
of an arbitration clause being present in the franchise contract.23 If
arbitration provides governance benefits, as we hypothesize, this result
would make sense. For on the theory that arbitration provides sub-
stantial governance benefits, it should be more important to have an
arbitration provision as the likelihood of a dispute over free riding
increases. And our findings show just such a correlation. As the likeli-
hood of a dispute over free riding increases (which happens as the
percentage of company-owned units falls) the likelihood of an arbitra-
tion provision in the franchise contract also increases.
The finding of a statistically significant, negative correlation be-
tween the percentage of company-owned units in a franchise network
and the probability of an arbitration clause appearing in the franchise
contract suggests that arbitration enhanced governance benefits in
the sample of franchise contracts that Chris Drahozal and I studied.
The likely reason for this is that arbitration provides a forum in which
industry experts can determine whether a franchisee's conduct should
be considered a valid basis for termination of the franchise contract.
The alternative forum for deciding this question, the courts, would
ask a jury to answer this question. Given the large number of ways in
which a franchisee could appear to be complying with the provisions
of a franchise contract while at the same time violating contract
norms, it is quite plausible that arbitration provides a more accurate
forum for determining whether the franchisor had a valid basis for
terminating a contract.
We also found evidence that arbitration provisions are designed
to avoid over-deterrence from excessive litigation and to minimize en-
forcement costs. For example, we found that the likelihood of an ar-
bitration provision jumps substantially if the parties have included a
contract provision limiting punitive damage awards. 24 That suggests
that if the franchisors are concerned that terminated franchisees will
go to court to seek large punitive damages, they are especially likely to
try to avoid that outcome by seeking to channel their disputes into
arbitration. In addition, we found that franchisors whose home of-
fices were located in a litigious jurisdiction were more likely to seek
arbitration than other franchisors. 25
23 Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 20, at 575.
24 Id. at 574.
25 Id.
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The empirical evidence reviewed here suggests that governance
benefits are an important reason that we see arbitration agreements.
This has important implications for the public debate on arbitration.
First, the finding that governance benefits provide a major reason
for arbitration agreements goes against the oft-repeated view that arbi-
tration contracts operate in effect as waivers. In other words, the oft-
repeated view is that potential plaintiffs sign away their legal rights
when they enter into arbitration regimes. However, the Eisenberg
and Hill, and Drahozal and Hylton studies suggest that arbitration
contracts do not operate as waiver agreements. To the extent that
they enhance governance benefits, they enhance at least some legal
rights.
Second, the empirical results on arbitration and governance ben-
efits suggest that the benefits of arbitration are more widespread than
typically thought. If arbitration agreements involved nothing more
than the waiver of rights, they would provide few if any social benefits
because they would simply redistribute costs. In addition, if arbitra-
tion agreements simply reduced litigation costs, they would be benefi-
cial, but in a limited sense connected to litigation. The finding that
they enhance governance benefits suggests that they result in organi-
zations working more effectively on a day-to-day basis. For example, if
arbitration agreements enhance governance benefits in franchise net-
works, then they probably reduce the risk of free riding behavior
within these networks. Reducing the frequency of free riding leads, in
turn, to more reliable, effective franchises.
I do not wish to be understood as providing an unqualified de-
fense of arbitration agreements. Of course it is possible for arbitra-
tion agreements to reduce the overall welfare of the contracting
parties or of society in general. 26 But that is also true of litigation-it
may or may not enhance society's welfare. 27 The theory of litigation
and arbitration has reached the stage where it is beginning to suggest
useful empirical tests of the social value of arbitration. The empirical
evidence on arbitration agreements remains sparse, and much more
work needs to be done in this area. I am hopeful that policy debates
concerning arbitration will soon be informed by solid empirical re-
search rather than speculation.
26 Hylton, supra note 1, at 230.
27 Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal
System, 11J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 339 (1982) (using equations and numerical examples to
describe the social and private costs of litigation).
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